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INTRODUCTION 
The questions of how responsible and how effective litigation on behalf 
of public rights is complicated in any of law, but perhaps issues involving 
property rights on long coastlines in an era of sea rise and climate changes 
presents an especially difficult problem.  First and foremost, there are many 
forms of property in contemporary society, which already makes determin-
ing the contents of the “bundle of sticks” making up property rights com-
plicated.  Property structures relations not only between individuals and 
their government, but also individuals and individuals, individuals and 
businesses, businesses and businesses, etc., and changes in those relation-
ships have long term consequences.  With regard to the case study I will 
discuss here, the relationship between individuals and their natural envi-
ronment enters into this mix in ways that, while not at all uncommon to 
property rights disputes involving land, certainly can provide us with an 
exemplary case for understanding how complex these relations are. 
One can imagine moments when property rights litigation along the 
coast would be both ethical and responsible.  Hypothetically, if a regulating 
agency is favoring permits from a particular type of business or particular 
individuals, while denying similar permit requests from similar business or 
 
∗ Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University.  I wish to thank Jesse Rap-
port-Herbert and Alex Rapport Herbert for their research assistance during archival research 
done on the hurricanes in Rhode Island during the summer of 2009.  In addition, some of the 
primary source material here comes courtesy of Special Collections, University of Rhode 
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individuals, a closer look at the permitting process is clearly merited.  In 
such circumstances, having a court review the process to ensure that the 
rules are being followed makes very good sense, indeed.  At other times, 
when the law has been in a process of change for a time, asking a court to 
determine the rights of disputants in order to clarify the law also makes a 
good deal of sense.  There clearly are other instances that make litigation in 
this arena important as an avenue for ensuring rights of individuals.  Yet, 
because property rights cases can often take years or even decades to ges-
tate in the administrative process and lower courts, it seems likely that, like 
Palazzolo, judgments about ethics and responsibilities may very much de-
pend upon where in the timeline of the dispute you look, the particular ex-
ercises of state police powers in question, as well as a consideration of the 
broader contextual factors giving shape to the dispute and litigation. 
Unfortunately, this is a much abbreviated version of the story, as space 
will not allow a full telling of a dispute that took nearly four decades to de-
velop and resolve.  Even so, I hope to persuade my readers that the com-
plexities of these problems deserves much more attention than litigation of-
ten affords them; and so, I suggest, we need to think about them away from 
the litigative process to better understand what litigation does to our under-
standing of rights claims.  And I do this, even as I hold to the possibility 
that at times going to court makes sense while simultaneously asserting that 
takings litigation aimed at broader social or political change may not be the 
most responsible and ethical way of ensuring individual rights in the face 
of natural disasters and coastal change. 
This essay will proceed as follows.  First, I will briefly recap the story of 
the court case and the key moments in the decision that, I think, exemplify 
the problems with this litigation.  The goal, here, will not be to produce a 
careful recounting of the facts of the case.  Rather, I want to point out the 
moments in a well known narrative that deserve some special attention 
given the broader issues of governance the state of Rhode Island was facing 
and the changing legal background in which Mr. Palazzolo was operating.  
In the section following, I will rework the tale of the dispute by placing it 
into a broader narrative involving the changing regulatory landscape in 
Rhode Island and the state’s goals in making those changes.  Here, we find 
a state struggling in the wake of natural disasters and attempting to create a 
new administrative response that both draws on but resists certain federal 
level activities.  Focusing on the beginnings of coastal management, and 
the decision to grant (then revoke) of permits brings to light the messiness 
of changing regulatory environments and the confusions that result from 
them.  Finally, I suggest that a review of the dispute in this context suggests 
that the ethics of litigating coastal takings cases may be complicated by the 
possibilities of natural disasters and sea level change. 
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I.  PALAZZOLO’S REGULATORY ODYSSEY 
The odyssey that produced Palazzolo v. Rhode Island1 has been re-
counted in various articles and books. 2  The story of the dispute begins in 
the late 1950’s, when Anthony Palazzolo, a lifelong resident of Westerly 
(located along the southern shore of the state) and owner of a junkyard, 
joined in corporate partnership that had bought 18 acres of land along the 
southern coast of Rhode Island in his native county. 3  The land had been 
zoned several years earlier for a residential subdivision.  The property itself 
is on a thin bar of land sitting between Winnepaug Pond and the Atlantic 
Ocean.  Mr. Palazzolo was aware that the land was marshy ponds and 
would require dredging and filling in order to develop for residential use.4  
However, in 1959 and throughout much of the 1960’s, the areas adjacent 
were filled in and dredged back so that in Mr. Palazzolo’s mind at the time 
of purchase, he believed that if he went through the appropriate permitting 
processes, he would be able to use the land as he hoped.5  After several 
years struggling with the permitting process, in 1971, the Division of Har-
bor Regulation approved an application he had made in 1963, and an appli-
cation made in 1966, and told Mr. Palazzolo to decide between the two (he 
could only build according to one of the two plans).6  However, a few 
 
 1. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 2. See generally David E. Cole, Analytical Chronology of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 171 (2002); H. David Gold, Relaxing the Rules:  The Supreme 
Court’s Quest for Balance in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 137 (2002). 
 3. This date is somewhat misleading; the issue of whether Mr. Palazzolo owned all the 
land in 1959 was something the Court had to decide.  The corporate partnership in which 
Mr. Palazzolo initially participated acquired the land in 1959.  In 1978, however, he became 
sole owner when the partnership dissolved.  Based upon the various dealings he made, the 
state argued that he did not own the land in full title until 1978, after the regulations were in 
place, and therefore he could have no expectations of building along the original plans.  The 
Pacific Legal Foundation (“PLF”) lawyers argued before the Court that the ownership rights 
were handed down from partner to partner, and that since, historically, building had been 
permitted in the area, Mr. Palazzolo had every right to expect he would be able to build.  See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (No. 99-2047).  During oral ar-
guments, however, it became clear that this would not be the take of at least some of the jus-
tices.  Justice Souter asked, “If the rights to land use pass from owner to owner, how far 
back does it go?  There is no logical stopping place until you get back to Roger Williams 
and the 17th-century settlement.”  Id.; see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup:  
Justices Press for Clarity in a Property Rights Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at A18. 
 4. See Anthony Flint, Landlocked on the Coast for 40 Years, Anthony Palazzolo Has 
Battled RI Over Property Rights, All the Way to the Supreme Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
3, 2002, at B1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Cole, supra note 2, at 177. 
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months later the DHR revoked their assent.  Mr. Palazzolo never appealed 
this revocation.7 
His difficulties became worse in 1971 after the establishment of the 
Coastal Resource Management Council (“CRMC”).  As discussed below, 
the state legislature gave the CRMC power to regulate the area, with the 
two-fold and contradictory mandate to both preserve and regulate devel-
opment of the coast line.8  Moreover, the CRMC was granted authority, 
“over land areas (those areas above the mean high water mark)” and lim-
ited “to that necessary to carry out effective resources management.”9  Be-
cause the CRMC’s jurisdiction is defined by the mean high water mark 
(i.e., think of the scum line that forms after high tide in tidal zones—this is 
roughly the line that is used to determine the CRMC’s jurisdiction), the 
state legislature had created one of the most powerful organizations in the 
state.  Since there are 420 miles of coastline in Rhode Island, and tidal wa-
ters include parts of the rivers running into various bays, the CRMC is re-
sponsible for permitting and regulating a very large portion of the land in 
our smallest state. 
Over the course of the next decade and a half, while Rhode Island began 
to work to solve its coastal erosion and pollution problems within the 
frameworks of federal laws and state regulations, the CRMC’s power grew.  
Mr. Palazzolo, at times with long periods between permit applications, con-
tinued to try to develop his land.  Finally, in the wake of a state level deci-
sion, Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown,10 Mr. Palazzolo filed a com-
plaint alleging inverse condemnation, and demanded that the state pay him 
$3 million for the property.11  As his case made its way through the Rhode 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-1 (1956).  The goals of the program are: 
[to carry out the] policy of this state to preserve, protect, develop, and where pos-
sible, restore the coastal resources of the state for this and succeeding generations 
through comprehensive and coordinated long-range planning and management de-
signed to produce the maximum benefit for society from such coastal resources; 
and that preservation and restoration of ecological systems shall be the primary 
guiding principle upon which environmental alteration of coastal resources will be 
measured, judged, and regulated. 
Id. § 46-23-1(a)(2). 
 9. Id. § 46-23-6(2)(iii).  The statute continues, “This shall be limited to the authority to 
approve, modify, set conditions for, or reject the design, location, construction, alteration, 
and operation of specified activities or land uses when these are related to a water area under 
the agency’s jurisdiction, regardless of their actual location.”  Id. 
 10. Annicelli v. Town of South Kingston, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983). 
 11.  Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council of State, WC No. 88-927, 1988 WL 
1017232, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1988). 
HATCHER_CHRISTENSEN 6/8/2009  8:39:17 PM 
2009] ODYSSEY OF PALAZZOLO 853 
Island courts, Mr. Palazzolo’s arguments were rejected again and again, 
and more than once for lack of ripeness.12 
In reviewing a the decision by the Coastal Resources Management 
Council’s (“CRMC”) to deny Palazzolo’s request to fill in the salt marsh on 
his land.  The decision was upheld by the Superior Court.13  The CRMC 
had denied his permit arguing that the eighteen acres of land that Mr. Pa-
lazzolo wanted to fill in amounted to 12% of the marshes surrounding the 
pond – filling this area in would jeopardize the future of Winnapaug Pond.  
Ultimately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected his appeal, finding 
that the case was not ripe as Mr. Palazzolo had not yet “explored develop-
ment options less grandiose than filling eighteen acres of salt marsh.”14 
The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court after the Pacific Legal 
Foundation stepped in and sponsored the case.  The Court decided the case 
in 2001 and its decision was hailed as a victory by both the State Attorney 
General and the Pacific Legal Foundation.15  Much of the decision is fo-
cused upon the issue of ripeness, and indeed, if any part of the majority 
opinion is important for future cases, it is this section of the opinion.  For 
our purposes, one of the more interesting moments in the case had to do 
with the state’s contention that Palazzolo had not become sole owner of the 
land until after the wetlands regulations were in place.  Thus, reasoned 
Rhode Island, he could not have expectations of filling the wetlands.  The 
state relied upon two different standards: one, based in Lucas,16 relied 
heavily on the background principles of the state’s property law; and sec-
ond, grounded in an understanding of investment-backed expectations 
based upon the ruling in Penn Central.17  The Court, reading these two to-
gether, found that they produced one “sweeping” rule: “A purchaser or a 
successive title holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-
enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking.”18 
The Court disagreed with Rhode Island’s reading of the case law.  In an 
oft quoted passage, Kennedy wrote, “The State may not put so potent a 
 
 12. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 785 A.2d. 561, 561 (R.I. 2001); Palazzolo v. State 
ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000); Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 
WL 1645974, at *15 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2005); Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, No. 
C.A. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1997); Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. 
Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 86-1496, 1995 WL 941370, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 13. Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974, at *15. 
 14. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 714. 
 15. See, e.g., Peter B. Lord, Turf Battle Supreme – Property Rights Affirmed; Payment 
Denied, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., June 29, 2001, at 1A (discussing the state’s claim to victory). 
 16. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 17. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York , 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 18. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001). 
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Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”19  He went on to argue that, 
while states are within their authority to set rules for the improvement of 
land and valid zoning and land-use restrictions, the takings clause provides 
owners with the right to claim that the state is exercising its authority in an 
unreasonable or onerous way, creating circumstances compelling compen-
sation.20  If Rhode Island’s interpretation of the case law were correct, than 
future owners would not be able “to challenge unreasonable limitations on 
the use and value of land.”21  Kennedy appeared to find this especially 
problematic because, in takings cases, a claim may take years to ripen.  An 
heir to land that has such a claim going through this process would not be 
able to press the claim and assert a taking.  “The State’s rule,” wrote Ken-
nedy, “would work a critical alteration to the nature of property, as the 
newly regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to transfer the interest 
which was possessed prior to the regulation.  The State may not by this 
means secure a windfall for itself.”22  Moreover, Kennedy found this pro-
posed rule to be “capricious in effect”: 
The young owner contrasted with the older owner, the owner with the re-
sources to hold contrasted with the owner with the need to sell, would be 
in different positions.  The Takings Clause is not so quixotic.  A blanket 
rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim 
becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to com-
pensate for what is taken.23 
Kennedy then distinguished the type of taking presented in Palazzolo 
with direct condemnation.  In direct condemnation cases or in a physical 
taking, the extent of the taking is already known.24  The case ripens quickly 
and so the award goes to the owner at the time of the taking.25  However, as 
Palazzolo demonstrates, a takings case can ripen slowly over years when 
regulations are in question.  Kennedy relied upon the decision in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission26 in finding that in land-use regulation 
cases, it is not only illogical, but also unfair to stop takings claims because 
there was a post-enactment transfer of ownership and the previous owner 
had not been able to take the steps to ripen the claim.27  The state, in press-
 
 19. Id. at 627 
 20. Id. at 627-30. 
 21. Id. at 627. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 628 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 629. 
 26. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 27. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629. 
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ing their reading of the case, relied upon Lucas and the idea that the back-
ground principles of the state’s property law determine what expectations 
can be shaped.28  Kennedy rejects this as an argument because, he says, the 
state seems to want to say, “any new regulation, once enacted, becomes a 
background principle . . . .”29 
The decision itself was murky in places, and did not produce a clear win 
for either side of the argument.  The decision was perhaps not as important 
to either side as both sides tried to claim at the time, what seems important 
here is that the decision itself did not do what property rights advocates had 
hoped, nor did it do what the state of Rhode Island wanted it to do.30  The 
property rights movement did not receive a ruling that bolstered or clarified 
Lucas.  Nor did the State Attorney General receive a decision that provided 
clear direction concerning the reach of the state’s ability to regulate coastal 
lands.  Instead, Kennedy chose a solomonic approach, focusing his deci-
sions on elements of the case that did not reach the issue of a regulatory 
taking.  Yet, the understanding of ripeness may well have opened the door 
to the introduction of more of these cases entering the courts generations 
after the land was originally purchased.  Kennedy likely had good reasons 
for this choice.  During oral arguments, it became clear that the Palazzolo 
claim could not conform to the definition of a “total takings” in regulatory 
takings law.31  There were two acres of useable upland, and it was clear 
that because of this the Court was not willing to use the case to make a 
clear statement about regulatory takings. 
At the same time, however, it is important to note that a claim that has 
taken decades to ripen (even generations) may become deeply problematic 
in part because the changing context in which the dispute is understood 
may change the very nature of the disagreement.32  For example, the deci-
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Lord, supra note 15. 
 31. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (No. 99-2047). 
 32. As one contemplates the possibility of property cases taking decades to ripen, and 
families being affected, one is painfully reminded of the warning that Charles Dickens gave 
us in his novel, Bleak House.  CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 5-6 (Pollard & Moss, Lon-
don 1884) (1853).  In it, a court case involving family inheritance takes, quite literally, gen-
erations to resolve.  In the meantime, the lawyers become rich and the family members 
move on, in some cases to disrepute while other members simply leave the case to run its 
own course.  Ultimately, more lives are destroyed by the case than are helped.  As Dickens 
writes in the first chapter: 
How many people out of the suit Jarndyce and Jarndyce has stretched forth its 
unwholesome hand to spoil and corrupt, would be a very wide question.  From the 
master, upon whose impaling files reams of dusty warrants in Jarndyce and 
Jarndyce have grimly writhed into many shapes; down to the copying clerk in the 
Six Clerk’s Office who has copied his tens of thousands of Chancery-folio pages 
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sion did not address some of the broader issues that were playing them-
selves out in the state during the entire period of time from Mr. Palazzolo’s 
purchase to the present day.  Before considering these matters, we will take 
a step back and try to understand (however briefly) what some of those 
broader issues were and continue to be.  The goal in the following section 
of this paper is to demonstrate that the dispute in which Mr. Palazzolo 
found himself mired had much to do with the changing notions of “coasts,” 
“wetlands,” and, quite importantly, the political status of the CRMC.  What 
we, today, call “coastal zone management” has always been an element of 
law in Rhode Island, though it had a much different character in other peri-
ods of the state’s history.33  One final note: the administrative develop-
ments discussed below form part of a rich primordial soup in which the 
dispute finds its genesis.  In order to understand some of those changes, I 
will back up a little further in time in an attempt to show that the produc-
tion of the space we call “wetlands” along this coast is, as Lefebvre has 
suggested, “a set of relations between things.”34  Those “things” include 
people, governments, as well as the changing conditions of the coast. 
II.  THE OCEAN STATE 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island took over thirty years to make its way to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and was not fully resolved until nearly three years af-
ter the its ruling in 2001.  This very long period of time was filled with 
many decisions made by the leaders of the state that, ultimately, set the 
stage for the Supreme Court case.  Yet, looking at the longer period of time 
provides us with a better sense of how this local dispute was part of a his-
torical process that ultimately shaped an element of our national law. 
Divided by rivers making their way to the ocean, the State of Providence 
Plantations and Rhode Island has always depended upon the ocean and the 
coast for its very existence.  Indeed, from its earliest days, the importance 
 
under that eternal heading; no man’s nature has been made better by it.  In trick-
ery, evasion, procrastination, spoliation, botheration, under false pretences of all 
sorts, there are influences that can never come to good . . . and even those who 
have contemplated its history from the outermost circle of such evil, have been in-
sensibly tempted into a loose way of letting bad things alone to take their own bad 
course, and a loose belief that if the world go wrong, it was, in some off-hand 
manner, never meant to go right. 
Id. at 5-6.  In the novel, when the case is finally decided, there is no inheritance left and the 
family members who may be able to inherit are left sick and destitute. 
 33. See Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s 
Shore, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 313 (1990) 
 34. HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 83 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 
Wiley-Blackwell 1991) (1974). 
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of the ocean to the economics and culture of the state cannot be overstated.  
As one historian has written, “From its founding through the Colonial Era, 
Rhode Islanders founded the bulk of their towns on the Narragansett Bay.  
Geography provided a physical setting for extensive maritime commerce, 
and Rhode Island came to be known as New England’s ‘ocean colony.’”35  
Even today, Newport, Jamestown and the communities on the Narragansett 
Bay perform a vital role in the state’s economic health as tourist attractions. 
From a legal standpoint, the ocean’s importance has played a role in the 
history of the state by not only constructing some of its boundaries, but also 
as the site of legal disputes and administrative contestations.  In its early 
days, the state allowed development of navigable waterways, for example, 
wharf construction, to promote economic development.36  However, in the 
twentieth century, the notion that the swampy, marshy coastal lands were 
not “wastelands,” as stated in the King’s colonial charter, but rather “wet-
lands” that have an importance all their own, was one that came from learn-
ing more about the relationship of the ocean to storm surges and the grow-
ing need to regulate development in the form of housing, tourism, and 
fisheries.  The politics of the legal dispute as it worked its way through the 
regulatory processes was one part of the constitution of wetlands in the 
state.  These were politics that, in many ways remained distinct from the 
final arguments made to the U.S. Supreme Court by the lawyers for the Pa-
cific Legal Foundation who represented Mr. Palazzolo.  They were, how-
ever, lurking in the background of the Attorney General’s position.37  More 
importantly, if one only considers the court cases, they certainly predated 
the Supreme Court decision by over a decade; and by two decades, if one 
looks beyond the cases and into the administrative process. 
From the State’s perspective, the problems with coastal and land man-
agement began in 1938 when a powerful hurricane hit the eastern seaboard, 
causing massive devastation to the area.  This hurricane, horrific in its 
speed and force, has never received a name beyond the designation of “the 
Great Hurricane of 1938.”  In the Ocean State, it resulted in 262 deaths, and 
property damage of approximately $100 million 1938 dollars (approxi-
mately $1 billion 2008 dollars).  In 1944, another hurricane hit the eastern 
coast and also caused enormous damage.  Then, again, in 1954, Hurricane 
Carol wreaked devastation on a level with the 1938 hurricane; though 
 
 35. JOSEPH A. CONFORTI SAINTS AND STRANGERS:  NEW ENGLAND IN BRITISH NORTH 
AMERICA 68 (2006). 
 36. Nixon, supra note 33, at 313. 
 37. See Brief for Respondents, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-
2047); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-45, Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (No. 99-
2047) (discussing Rhode Island’s legal past). 
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unlike that earlier hurricane, it caused only 19 deaths, while destroying 
twice as many structures and causing $200 million dollars in damage.38  
Cumulatively, the damage caused by these three hurricanes—one a decade 
for three decades—forced state governments in the northeast to move to 
deal with the economic difficulties that arose in the wake of floods and 
high winds.  Damaged and ruined homes, businesses that were destroyed, 
and flooded land that was expensive to drain and fill, were all parts of the 
state government’s concerns.  Along with these issues, a growing body of 
science pointed out that the marshy areas along the coast were quite likely 
necessary for protecting the land and its inhabitants during these storms. 
Each hurricane hit the southern coast of Rhode Island very hard.  This 
reality meant that Rhode Island, in particular, needed to act to protect its 
citizens as well as the land within its borders, a core element of its sover-
eignty and part of its state police powers.  In direct response to Hurricane 
Carol, the Rhode Island Development Council published a study of the 
Rhode Island Coastal Region.39  The report’s aim was to consider ways to 
minimize damage not only along the coast but in the state as a whole from 
future storms.  In 1956, the state passed the “Shore Development Act of 
1956” in the hopes of assisting municipalities in protecting the beach areas 
from further erosion and damage.40  The agency within the state assigned 
with implementation of this act was the Department of Natural Resources, 
Division of Harbors and Rivers.  It was from this agency that Palazzolo and 
his business partners would, initially, need to apply for permits to build on 
their land.  But already we see with this early activity the state was working 
toward solving a serious problem, and in so doing, was beginning a process 
that would at the shift some of the property relations along the coast. 
Increasing regulation at the national level made it more difficult to get 
permits to build in local areas coming to be known as the coastal zone be-
cause it also is subject to flooding, and even more difficult to have flood 
 
 38. UNIV. OF R.I. SEA GRANT PROGRAM, COASTAL RES. CTR., HURRICANES IN RHODE IS-
LAND, http://nsgl.gso.uri.edu/riu/riug97006.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). 
 39. Information concerning this report and early regulatory efforts is drawn heavily 
from Lee R. Whitaker, A Review and Evaluation of the State of Rhode Island Coastal Re-
sources Management Program (1981) (unpublished Master’s Thesis, Univ. of R.I., on file 
with author).  Whitaker’s master’s thesis, I discovered while doing field work, is both 
widely known and frequently cited in reports about the Coastal Resource Management 
Council and statewide planning.  Whitaker discusses the Development Council’s 1956 re-
port entitled The Rhode Island Shore, a Regional Guide Plan Study, 1955-1970, that at-
tempted to establish a fifteen year plan for regulation along the coast.  See Whitaker, supra, 
at 23-24.  The Development Council was, according to Whitaker, a precursor to the De-
partment of Economic Development.  Id. 
 40. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-3-1 to -30 (1956). 
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insurance cover new construction.41  Rhode Island, with it’s extensive 
coastline was part of this national trend.  While it was possible to build 
without a permit, to do so meant that they would have to build without a 
mortgage or bank financing.42  This was prohibitive, to say the least, for 
anyone who was not already wealthy; moreover, it was truly high risk be-
cause clearly based upon recent experience, the area was at risk for storm 
damage and flooding.  Rhode Island (and other coastal states) continued to 
struggle with these issues through the 1960’s. 
In March of 1969, just a few months after taking office, Governor Frank 
Licht set up a committee to look into and consider how best to regulate the 
coastal area. The Technical Committee on the Coastal Zone released its 
preliminary findings and recommendations a year later, in March of 1970.  
In part, the creation of the committee was a response to two other docu-
ments that had been published in early 1969: a report written by the Natural 
Resources Group, and the report of the Commission on Marine Science, 
Engineering and Resources.43  The latter was commissioned by the U.S. 
Congress, and was known as the Stratton Commission.44  Together, they 
highlighted for the Governor and his staff the need to manage the coastal 
zone more effectively in order both make use of the coast for a variety of 
economic activities, while also seeking out funding through a promising 
federal level commitment to coastal zone management. 
With these documents in the background, Governor Licht charged the 
Technical Committee to consider what “effective management” of the Nar-
 
 41. Dan R. Anderson, The National Flood Insurance Program—Problems and Poten-
tial, 41 J. RISK & INS. 579 (1974); Robert S. Felton et al., A Mid-1970 Report on the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program, 38 J. RISK & INS. 1 (1971). 
 42. See Anderson, supra note 41, at 589 (discussing this from an historical perspective). 
 43. NATURAL RES. GROUP, REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF NARRAGANSETT BAY 
(1969); see also COMM’N ON MARINE SCI., ENG’G & RES., OUR NATION AND THE SEA (1969), 
available at http://www.lib.noaa.gov/noaainfo/heritage/stratton/title.html. 
 44. The Stratton Commission was a blue ribbon commission established in 1966 
through the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act.  Among the commission 
members was John Knauss, Dean of the Graduate School of Oceanography, University of 
Rhode Island.  Knauss would go on to play a significant role at URI by establishing the 
Coastal Research Center, which serves as main scientific resource for Rhode Island’s 
Coastal Resource Management Council.  For a discussion of the Stratton Commission and 
relevant historical information pertaining to its formation, see William J. Merrell et al., The 
Stratton Commission:  The Model for a Sea Change in National Marine Policy, 14 OCEAN-
OGRAPHY 11 (2001), available at http://www.tos.org/oceanography/issues/issue_ 
archive/issue_pdfs/14_2/14.2_merrell_et_el.pdf.  For a broader discussion of ocean policy 
and the politics around the changing federal environmental framework, see EDWARD WENK, 
JR., THE POLITICS OF THE OCEANS (1972). 
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ragansett Bay would require.45  The Technical Committee, by all appear-
ances, seems to have taken this charge very seriously indeed.  After a series 
of meetings with a variety of citizen groups, industry groups, and individu-
als involved in land management, it wrote an extensive report about both 
the challenges and the opportunities involved in coastal management.  Op-
portunities included increased tourism, more effective use of land for other 
economic development, as well as the opportunity to gain a foothold in the 
research funded through governmental agencies and industry into use of the 
bay for fishing as well as various forms of environmental science.46  
Among the challenges delineated by the group was coordinating the vari-
ous environmental and land use planning agencies at the local and state 
levels, coordinating with other states through interstate compacts, as well 
as coordinating with the federal government where jurisdictions overlapped 
and in instances where the federal government could provide resources for 
state-level planning programs.47 
Within a few years, and largely because of the Technical Committee’s 
recommendations, the state legislature passed the Rhode Island Coastal Re-
sources Management Act of 1971.48  This statute established the CRMC, 
which originally had close ties to the Department of Natural Resources.  
Yet it also remained distinct from that division and was provided with 
much broader powers of Coastal Management than the Division of Harbors 
and Rivers ever had.  Thus, while Mr. Palazzolo’s odyssey began with one 
regulatory agency, as of 1971 he was dealing with a new agency – and it 
 
 45. GOVERNOR'S TECHNICAL COMM. ON NARRAGANSETT BAY & COASTAL ZONE, REPORT 
OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMITTEE ON THE COASTAL ZONE 2 (1970) [hereinafter COASTAL 
ZONE REPORT]. 
 46. Indeed, one of the pieces of the story of environmental regulation in Rhode Island as 
well as various other coastal states is the desire for fostering oceanography as a science and 
bringing funding into their institutions of higher education.  One of the key figures in this 
activity at the national level was Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington.  He was in-
tensely concerned with establishing a Sea Grant Program (analogous to the Land Grant Pro-
gram that helped build up many of the universities in the Midwest).  For a more detailed 
discussion of these activities, see SHELBY SCATES, WARREN G. MAGNUSON AND THE SHAPING 
OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 178 (1997) (discussing integrating ocean research and 
funding into Cold War discussions). 
 47. Id. at n.38.  A lengthy discussion of the “activities and problems” involved in the 
coastal zone is contained in Part 3 of the Coastal Zone Report.  See COASTAL ZONE REPORT, 
supra note 45, at 56-100.  The Committee took pains to discuss these matters with reference 
to specific areas of the state and how management could affect various activities in them at 
the local level.  For a discussion of the state-level coordination, see id. at 6-14, 36-48.  See 
also id. at 49-55 (discussing local matters); id. at 32-35 (discussing interstate compacts); id. 
at 15-31 (discussing coordination issues). 
 48. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-1 (1956). 
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was an agency that was just beginning to understand both its power and its 
limitations. 
The Coastal Resource Management Council came into being, then, in 
part as a response to the growing needs of the government to regulate its 
coast for both safety and economic development reasons.  Unfortunately, 
organizing its offices and staff, as well as determining the reach of its own 
powers destabilized the property relations along the coast for quite some-
time.  It was this tangled mess that Mr. Palazzolo stepped into when he be-
gan, once again, to file permits to develop his land.  One could describe this 
situation as “changing expectations” in the way that property scholars 
sometimes describe changes to property rights law.  I think, however, it is 
more accurately described as a changed and still changing political setting.  
Mr. Palazzolo had been granted, for a period of several months, applica-
tions he’d filed years before.49  However, the CRMC rescinds those grants 
as soon as it has had time to review them.  Eventually, Mr. Palazzolo 
throws up his hands and decides to go to court.  The rest, as they say, is his-
tory.  But that the situation was both frustrating and difficult to deal with 
from both Mr. Palazzolo’s perspective as well as from the state’s, cannot 
really be doubted.  Clarity was needed in the law, but the politics were 
making that clarity difficult to achieve. 
CONCLUSION 
When the land is slowly eroding into the Atlantic Ocean, the very real 
possibility that the state itself will eventually disappear becomes shock-
ingly apparent and, over the course of several decades, a narrative strategi-
cally deployed to control and define the space adjacent to the ocean.  This 
increasingly real possibility made the necessity of protecting its coast very 
clear to the Rhode Island government.  Sovereign power has a strong inter-
est in ensuring the integrity of the land within its boundaries.  “The prob-
lem of security”, as Foucault explained in his lecture of 11 January 1978, is 
the “problem of predicting a series of events.”  He explained that “the man-
agement of these series that, because they are open series can only be con-
trolled by an estimate of probabilities is pretty much the essential character-
istic of the mechanism of security.”50  The probabilities of a hurricane, of 
coastal erosion, and possible repercussions to watersheds all play a role in 
the story of wetlands in Rhode Island, and ultimately shape both the wet-
 
 49.  In re Application of Anthony Palazzolo (R.I. Dep’t of Natural Res., Div. of Harbors 
& Rivers Apr. 2, 1971) (admin. decision) (on file with papers of Governor Frank Licht, Box 
75, File 1078, Special Collections, Univ. of R.I. Library). 
 50. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION:  LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE 
OF FRANCE, 1977-1978, at 20 (2007). 
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lands themselves and the rights claims made by Anthony Palazzolo over 
the course of forty years. 
Rhode Island, in part because it has so much coast line to protect, began 
to reformulate its laws out of necessity to protect its own coast.  The an-
swers as to how one ought to proceed (i.e., what is responsible and what is 
ethical) may not rest in rights claims made in courts alone.  Such an asser-
tion flies in the face of an understanding of the takings clause that would 
either preclude such regulation altogether, or make it exceedingly difficult 
in situations where the economic stability of a state is already in question 
(i.e., the state won’t be able to afford to pay “just compensation” for regu-
lations). 
The question of whether the state has the right to “take” (in the form of 
regulation) land in its coastal zones is a much more complex question that 
the courts, to date, have not been able to manage adequately.  The problems 
faced along the coasts are difficult problems, and will likely not be settled 
by asking judges to determine the “rightness” of claims made through an 
adversarial process that tends to oversimplify situations in the process of 
constructing winnable legal arguments.  Nor can we rely simply on admin-
istrative agencies or legislatures to protect the rights of individuals or pro-
tect them adequately from natural disasters.  Clearly, the citizenry needs to 
be more active in these matters, and the administrative process needs to be 
both transparent and simplified.  Quite frankly, it makes as much sense to 
have these cases drag out over decades as it does to have them framed in a 
way that oversimplifies the complex political challenges facing the gov-
ernments attempting to regulate their coasts. 
The courts should stand ready to engage in oversight of these processes; 
but, if we can learn anything from Palazzolo, it may be that litigating with 
an overly simple goal of increasing private property rights could, in fact, 
only make matters more difficult because it will force the courts to con-
tinue muddling the waters of the takings clause.  From a social science per-
spective, the longer the resolution, the more complicated and difficult the 
situation becomes.  Prolonging the process into decades, then, is the last 
thing that should happen. 
